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human rights violation. The UN text is thus a useful base for
developing the law in the future, with the aim of ensuring reparations
for all victims of human rights violations.
E. Darren Hutchinson

59

It is hard to go last, especially when there have been many good
presentations. I find myself in a difficult situation talking about the
United States’ domestic law on reparations. As the other panelists
have demonstrated, international human rights law on this issue is
complicated, even where formal structures permit claims of redress.
In the United States domestic law context, however, no coherent,
organized, sustained body of legislation deals with reparations as
such. Instead, the reparations movement in the United States has
consisted of individuals, discrete groups of individuals, or social
movements making claims before state and federal lawmakers and
courts for remediation of collective harms that they or their ancestors
have experienced. Accordingly, in the United States context, we see
appeals to common law, statutory law, and constitutional law as a
basis for group remediation, and typically, these claims reach back
into periods of history, rather than focusing on contemporary acts of
injustice.
The lack of a precise definition of “reparations” also complicates
the situation in the United States. International law, however, offers
some interesting insight on this issue. Furthermore, general trends
have emerged in jurisprudence and scholarship on this issue. From
this research and international analogues, reparations are commonly
viewed as judicial or legislative remedies for sustained past or present
injustice towards a particular group. The essence of reparations is
remediation for collective harms.
One final point complicates the United States’ situation (and this
subject did not receive much attention from the other panelists):
how far into the past should state actors reach to remedy injustice?
Culturally, in the United States’ system, discussion of reparations
typically centers around issues pertaining to slavery and Native
American land claims. Although I generously support remediation of
prior and ongoing injustice, reparations claims raise difficult matters
including: (1) defining the class of “injured” people; (2) explaining
why this present-day class is in fact injured when the actions upon

59. Darren Hutchinson is a Professor of Law at American University Washington
College of Law. His areas of expertise include constitutional law, and Equal Protection
Theory and equitable remedies.
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which remediation is based took place in the past; and
(3) considering whether some forms of remediation—for example,
land redistribution—present fairness questions when implemented
today. Although I agree with reparations advocates that compelling
arguments justify the provision of reparations, these questions still
form a legitimate part of the debate.
In this talk, I will provide a general overview of reparations
discourse in the United States and offer some suggestions concerning
how advocates of reparations might frame their claims. First, I will
identify some of the policies that one might consider when
advocating reparations in the U.S. context. As a remedies professor, I
will invoke remedies law (judicial remedies doctrine) as an analogy
for this discussion. Remedies law provides a helpful framework for
thinking about reparations in the legislative context, and this subject
matter necessarily shapes claims for reparations made in a judicial
setting.
Second, I will examine some of the political and legal barriers to
reparations in the United States. Reparations for racial injustice, in
particular, are hindered by a common perception among many
whites who see the United States as having attained equal opportunity
and who view current racial inequality as a product of the lack of
initiative among persons of color. Many whites also embrace
remediation so long as they do not feel that they are potentially
impacted by policies to remedy racial oppression.
Finally, I will discuss my personal preference for structural
legislative remedies, as opposed to discrete, compensatory, and
judicial remedies for past injustices. I hope to demonstrate that in
terms of providing redress, structural reforms offer the best hope for
broader improvement in the social and economic status of oppressed
people in the United States.
1.

What are “reparations”?: A remedies law analogy
Proponents of reparations have framed their claims for redress
around a variety of forms of relief, but their claims often include
monetary compensation. Remedies law, or the body of doctrines and
statutory rules the courts apply when supplying relief to litigants,
provides a helpful structure for thinking about the range of possible
instruments that might serve to redress prior, collective injustice.
Remedies law identifies several categories of redress for litigants.
Damages compensate for harm. Restitution removes the ill-gotten
gains from the defendant and returns them to the plaintiff.
Structural remedies seek to reform important social institutions to
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bring them into compliance with legal norms. Also, ordinary
injunctions prohibit future harms or rectify prior injustice. These
different baskets of remedies can serve as a prism for thinking about
reparations either as a legislative or as a judicial tool.
The historical and contemporary debates surrounding remedies in
the United States demonstrate the relevance of the remedies analogy.
For example, Japanese-Americans who were interned during World
War II received monetary compensation for their injuries.
Restitution has been a form of relief sought by individuals in
reparations cases, as in litigation seeking disgorgement of profits of
companies that benefited from slavery.
And as early as
Reconstruction, some former slaves demanded land and subsistence
from plantation owners as a way of restoring the unjust gains of
coerced labor and oppression. Also, during the Civil War and
continuing into the earlier parts of Reconstruction, Congress created
the Freedmen’s Bureau, which distributed (with varying degrees of
success and intensity) food, education, health care, legal services, and
other important benefits to the freed slaves. Finally, in terms of
injunctions, the post-Civil War era produced a body of constitutional
provisions and statutory enactments designed to prevent future
harms and rectify prior injustice.
2.

Political and legal barriers to reparations
An important part of the debate over reparations in the U.S.
context centers upon political and legal constraints. One element of
contention concerns remediation of historical wrongs. Opponents to
reparations argue that the injustices addressed by contemporary
reparations movements, particularly for slavery and Jim Crow laws,
took place in the remote past. Accordingly, they often view
remediation as an unfair “punishment” of innocent individuals and
an undeserved benefit to potential recipients of redress.
Additionally, the U.S. electorate tends to disfavor economic
redistribution generally.
Because reparations advocates
simultaneously demand redistribution and seek to rectify prior
wrongs, their claims receive very little public support, as opinion data
persistently confirm.
One thing that I find interesting in this debate is the failure of the
opponents of reparations to treat remedies for gross human rights or
civil rights deprivations as a public good, rather than as a series of
private transactions that benefit or burden individuals. If we view
rectifying prior and current injustice as a public good (that improves
human capital or that fortifies our national commitment to justice,
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etc.), then reparations can lose their individuated character. Seen in
this light, reparations also become compelling for contemporary
society, despite the passage of time between the wrongdoing and the
remediation. If historical wrongs burden society today, then one
could make a compelling argument to support contemporary redress.
3.

Structural/legislative relief
In the little time that remains, I will discuss why I prefer legislative
reparations over a litigation strategy. A litigation model provides very
little hope for success in this area. First, in terms of the Supreme
Court, public opinion serves as a powerful constraint upon Court
rulings. Furthermore, the Court has defined rights and equality as
protecting individuals rather than groups. Accordingly, groups face a
difficult time pressing claims of injustice or convincing the Court that
they require judicial solicitude. Moreover, equal protection doctrine
requires that plaintiffs prove that governmental defendants acted
intentionally to create harm. While many foreign jurisdictions,
including international human rights structures, define inequality
around intent or effects, federal court doctrine in the United States
tends to dismiss evidence of disparate effects, which makes many
conditions of extreme inequality (unequal distribution of educational
resources, disparities in the administration of criminal justice, etc.)
beyond judicial invalidation.
In addition to these doctrinal and institutional constraints, the
litigation model also fails because it distorts the impact of broad
abuses of human and civil rights. Litigation attempts to provide a
particularized remedy to a discrete plaintiff or class of plaintiff for
identifiable, contemporary activity. While this model might help to
rectify some instances of injustice, on many levels it obfuscates the
injurious nature of oppression, which creates pervasive and dispersed
harms rather than discrete and particularized injuries. Litigation
suggests that reparations implicate private harms and individualized
wrongdoing, which simply reinforces the negative perception of
reparations as a burden upon or unearned handout to individuals
rather than as a benefit to society.
Legislation can better respond to the dispersed nature of the
harms associated with oppression and provide the deep structural
reform necessary to rectify social injustice and to invest in human
capital. Along these lines, Alfred Brophy, who writes extensively on
reparations in the U.S. context, has proposed a community “social
welfare” model for framing reparations discussions, which
deemphasizes litigation. Instead, he focuses on seeking legislation
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that creates institutions that deliver resources to individuals who, due
to past or current injustices, cannot adequately navigate and access
these resources in the absence of governmental assistance. Due to
the time constraints of today’s panel, I am unable to elaborate on the
content of Brophy’s proposal or of similar writings, but this approach
more accurately captures the structural nature of subordination,
emphasizes the importance of sustained legislative treatment of prior
and ongoing injustice, and demonstrates the limitations of private
litigation strategies.
III. LAWYERING FOR REPARATIONS: INTER-AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE
60

A. Agustina Del Campo

My presentation today will address a slightly different issue than
what other panelists have been addressing this morning. The analysis
of reparations in the inter-American human rights system has mostly
been focused on the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, rather
than the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In fact, the
Commission’s recommendations are hardly ever addressed in
research studies dealing with reparations for international human
rights violations.
My presentation will be divided in two parts. First, I will briefly
summarize the general competence of the Commission and its
practice in affording remedies and reparations for victims under the
61
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; then I will
discuss challenges to the litigation of Lorenzo Enrique Copello Castillo v.
62
Cuba, a case that we brought with Washington College of Law’s
(“WCL”) Impact Litigation Project before the Commission in 2003
and was decided in November 2006.
Going to the first part of my presentation, the Commission is one
of the two supervisory organs of the inter-American system for the
protection of human rights. It was created in 1959 and was
incorporated into the Charter of the OAS as one of its main organs in
1960. With the adoption of the American Convention on Human

60. Agustina Del Campo, J.D., LL.M., is Coordinator of the Impact Litigation
Project at American University Washington College of Law.
61. Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, art. XVIII, 1948, O.A.S. Off. Rec., OEA/Ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21 rev.
6.
62. Copello Castillo v. Cuba, Case 12.477, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 68/06,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, doc. 4 rev. 1 (2006), available at http: //www.cidh.org/annual
rep/2006eng/CUBA.12477eng.htm.

